COMMENTS ON "INDONESIA: DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDELINES FOR POLICY AND OPERATION

Created: 5/24/1992

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. C.

Office Of IHE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (IrlTEUIGENCE)

FOR:

SUBJECT

H. Brubcck Executive Secretary Department of State

Connents on "Indonesia: Departnent of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations,

find this paperomewhatof Indonesia, 'hilo it is generally accurate onsituation,it nn-Wstates thefor the Free World in the as yet untested strength

of the Indonesian Comuunists and in the growing leverageto the USSR by its economic and military aid programs. More particularly, we feel that the army's opposition to the Cow"unists may grni'nMly MTrdercute programs. we questionettlement of the West New Guinea disputo will have as favorable as effect on US-Indonesian relations as this Guideline implies.

specific comments are as follows:

a. e would prefer anfparagraph as follows: "Indonesia signed anfor najor Soviet economicot ratify the agreement and receive assistanceuntil Its action at that timeeconomic dislocations caused by the takeoverinterests in late7 and8 andregional insurrection that deprived the centralof substantial export proceeds. Italso intended to point out displeasure over whatgovernment believed to be the Unitedin supporting the rebels. Always an advocateur-lljrr:!in-

creasing economic and military aid from the bloc8 while continuing to approach Western governments for similar categories of assistance andFinal sentence the same.)

Ol .

b. We would suggest adding to the Background sectionore specific explanation of the power picture in Indonesia--the interplay of Sukarno, the army, and the Communist party. Although these factors are, of course, dealt with in the paper, weummation using all or some of the following materialelpful.

"Sukarno, although still the one mostfactor in Indonesia, has becomeony and the Coromunisl i iciiin uneasy balanceeans of retainingposition. He attained his preeminent nositionpopularity--whichonsiderablethe masses, particularly thoseJar- -herepercent of the nation's population is located. trong political role since thewhen Sukarno turned to it to help him imposeand "hen theebellionfor nationwide military government. The amyposts in the inner cabinet, holds or influences atmore in thoost) cabinet, and by virtuevarious states of omcrgency that exist throughout+hn country, is entrenched at everyf The Comrxmist party, which nowillion like Sukarno draws its principal strength fromhas greatly benefited in terms of popular approvalpolicy ofting Sn'-nyno and has also profitedwhich he has given it in turn. Its majorlabor and the peasantry, and it isevels rhf?

cabinet reshuffle, two Communist leaders were givenrank but hold no portfolios; they participate only in plenary cabinet meetings which ore seldom hold."

statement onhat Sukarno haspersonal prestige to the Indonesian Eight-YearEconomic Development, although trueinitedbe taken to mean that Sukarno must make thePlan work or he will be finishedationalis not true.

reshuffled cabinet mentioned on page 5little changed practice .TOT th*cabinet, ine one important exception Is, asinuideline, the portfolio of Higher Education.

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effects of the December-April ricepartxsllv disproved the thesis that the ruralis cushioned from economic deterioration bynature of the economy. Shortages ofand consumer goods are readily exploitableCommunists who, however, direct most criticismarmy rathor than at Sukarno. In view of theinvolved in the rice situation, anotheryear or next seems toossibility. Whilea real crisis for theecondwould probably contribute to diminished prestigeane would tend to discredit theaeveio-

- to the Coaauniit party.

pagee questiontate=entUnited States has remained neutral" in the West New

Guinea dispute is accurately put. Ma would assume that the US Gove.nueut, in au^ttin^ettlo the dispute by finding ways in which the territory can be transferred to Indonesia, has adopted the Indonesian view more than that of the Dutch. etter way to express the US attitude would be to say: "This dispute, to which the US has activel)egotiated

suggest the advisability of redraftingparagraph running fromonto atparagraphs vrhich discuss the magnitude of thethe impactloc military training, and thefor US counteraction. They should take account

ie -uIlo..ing points:

CD We would prefer that the reference ono "United States sovernnent support of the armed rebellion of dissident groups in'Sumatra and Co lobes" be omittedaper likely to receive relatively wide distribution. The roference ons amended appears sufficient.

relations between Indonesiansdeteriorate, the Indonesians may considerFleet morehreat to their territor!-!

tnanndonesia ct.J

(pages

the Asian cainland.

Jacior which carries littlesince the dissolutionparty

"ijoslem suspicion of communism"

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aid figures onhould bo Our information is that Americanin the periodotaledcompared0 million extended to date

by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Startingndonesia has received0 million in Sino-Soviet Bloc military grants and credits; approximately half of the arms purchased under these arrangements have boon delivered.

believe that the scale of bloccombined with extensive bloc training andin our inevitablya significant, long-range impact on theof the officers' corns, especially at its

ofhould be recast Counter the Communist effort to project an imageUSolonial power and protector of colonial

we strongly endorse efforts toe suggost that they bo made in thea fullor appraisal of bloc programs and Communist Although allusions are made to both, wetha use of more specific material. Suchresult in the development of an increased andprogratr for use at both basic and top levelsmilitary services.

1. We suggest further treatment of Chinese Communist activitv and the Overseas Chinese. The Chinese are only mentioned in passing on

rs

Director (Intelligence)

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Original document.

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